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The Problem of Ambiguity and Moral Luck for Qur’anic Absolutism
Jake Sinderbrand ‘07
This paper argues that the Qur’an succeeds in presenting a basic
structure of morality, centered upon faith and charity, but it
ultimately lacks the necessary specificity to form a clear picture of
righteous conduct to which modern readers can reasonably
aspire. More significantly, the dualism of action, belief, and
consequence that gives the text its force and certainty does not
seem compatible with the recognition that circumstance plays a
role in determining what is good and what is bad action.
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The Problem of Ambiguity and Moral Luck for Qur’anic Absolutism
Jake Sinderbrand ‘07
On that day no soul shall suffer the least injustice. You shall be rewarded
according only to your deeds. (Qur’an 36:55)
Every religion must address the problem of inequality
and injustice in its theodicy, especially if it presumes the absolute
supremacy of God over evil, as does Islam. Some religious
traditions deny any semblance of justice in the world, some insist
that evil is never what it seems, while others, including Islam,
defend God against the charge of evil by presupposing a system
of individual eschatology based upon individual deeds, which is
naturally reliant upon the assumption of human freedom. In a
monotheistic religion, divinely-granted freedom implies some
sort of absolute morality, which the Qur’an reinforces constantly.
Furthermore, the Qur’an links its eschatology to each individual’s
morality (generally as it is manifested through their actions).
Even if we accept the existence of freewill in some form, people
commit certain actions and make moral choices based upon
circumstances over which they have no control. In a Muslim
system of eschatology, these actions ultimately weigh in favor of
or against the individual on the Day of Judgment and may
contribute to the rewards or punishments that they encounter in
the afterlife.
Philosophers state that our moral obligations are tied to
our luck in this life (we have to be patient in the face of poverty
only when we are poor, and rich people do not have a moral
obligation to be patient in the face of poverty). In addition, the
morality or immorality of our actions depends on the results of
these actions (the leaders of the American Revolution are heroes
because the revolution succeeded, but if it were to fail and result
in the execution of hundreds of thousands, they would have been
considered forces of evil.) If we assume for the sake of argument
that the claims of the Qur’an are genuine (i.e. that the text is
indeed the perfect, undiluted word of God), then this fortune of
circumstance and consequence, commonly termed “moral luck,”

http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/islam/vol1/iss2/5

2

Sinderbrand: The Problem of Ambiguity and Moral Luck

Macalester Islam Journal
Fall 2006
page 41
______________________________________________________
coupled with the ambiguous nature of what constitutes just
action, present an intractable problem for the Qur’an’s claim of
absolute justice for which it ultimately does not produce a
satisfactory solution.
The assertion in the Qur’an of its own uniqueness and
truth is not particular to Islam; most religions assert their
exclusive status as the sole harbingers of divine truth and
judgment, but few texts assert with such force that the details and
implications of that truth are naturally easy for the reader to
understand, and to understand why the revelation must be true.
Ira Zepp notes that this certainty in the validity of the text is the
cornerstone of the Islamic system of logic.39 That is, much of the
intellectual labor performed by Muslim scholars depends upon
this point to a great extent.
The Qur’an is relatively unique in that it is self-aware—
the author or authors write with the intention that the book itself
be used as a guide for humanity. This self-awareness gives the
Qur’an greater force, but does not allow for any imperfections
within the text itself, as the text must convey a stronger message
than others in order to prove its validity. The Qur’an states that
“to God belongs the convincing argument.” (6:149)40 Thus the
Qur’an frequently declares its own perfection, and implied in this
status is ease of understanding for the reader, for it declares,
“Thus God makes plain to you His revelations, so that you may
give thought,” (2:266) and states in the simplest fashion, “This
Book is not to be doubted.” (2:1)41 Despite this assurance, the
text seems relatively vague regarding most issues of law and
societal relations, and so a righteous course of action is not always
clear to the reader. The Qur’an further complicates this point by
saying of itself:
Some of its verses are precise in meaning—they
are the foundation of the Book—and others are
ambiguous. Those whose hearts are infected
with disbelief observe the ambiguous part, so as

39

Zepp, 194-5
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to create dissention by seeking to explain it. But
no one knows its meaning except God. (3:6-7)42
This passage reinforces the idea that “God guides whom He will
to a straight path.” (2:213)43 The emphasis of the Qur’an lies in
the greatness and mercy of God, rather than the actions that
inspire such mercy. John Esposito theorizes that the Qur’an’s
emphasis must be on God rather than human affairs because that
is the most central point that it reinforces. Essentially, the
Qur’an, as a perfect text, will say exactly what it needs to say, and
the fact that it focuses on the greatness of God and the
presentation of radical monotheism demonstrates the centrality
of that notion to all aspects of Islamic law and thought.44
The clarity on this point reinforces its importance to
Muslims, but it leaves specific areas of thought relatively murky.
One passage of the text can have several legitimate
interpretations, and that lack of clarity can lead to confusion
about the actual obligations that will bring reward or punishment
to an individual. For example, the Qur’an states in reference to
idol worship: “Abraham said: ‘Do you serve what you hew, when
God created you and what you make?’” (37:95)45 Two scholars,
Zamakhshari and Baydawi, responded to this segment in different
ways. Zamakhshari took the passage to generally reflect the
absurdity of idol worship while Baydawi saw it as emphasizing
God’s control over humans and what they accomplish, whether it
seems to be for good or for evil.46 The Qur’an can legitimately
have different meanings to different readers, but when two
readers can draw conclusions reflecting different opinions on the
issue of freewill versus fate from the same passage, the ease of
understanding of the text comes into question, and then it can
become unclear what responsibility people have for their actions.
Esposito notes that such intellectual activity is crucial to
understanding the Qur’an,47 but it introduces a realm of
42
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thought—and thereby faith—not available to the lay reader,
which seems to give the intelligent and literate a different
position in the Muslim world than other Muslims, giving them an
advantage in understanding the text, and enabling them to adapt
it to their own systems of belief. Of course, even two mutually
exclusive interpretations may still be seen equally valid with
regard to a certain passage, but the lack of moral certainty is still
problematic within a largely dualistic framework.
The main argument of the Qur’an—that of its legitimacy
as the one path to God—relies on its force, self-awareness, and
the certainty with which it is delivered. Due to this trait, the text
presents a very dualistic view of the world. In order to achieve its
promised clarity, the text must clearly distinguish what is right
from what is wrong, and these must be diametrically opposed in
order to establish a straight path. Esposito claims that action,
rather than belief, forms the basis of this path,48 although the
Qur’an itself contains numerous directives regarding faith. Its
opening exordium states: “Guide us to the straight path,” (1:6)49
establishing faith as the means by which to understand the
necessary course of action.
It would be unfair to suggest that Islam in general divides
the entire world into black and white, as most exegetes and
philosophers distinguish between levels of good and bad, both in
terms or actions and consequences in the afterlife. Kenneth
Cragg points out that the exegetical tradition has been so strong
and thorough in attempting to clarify these intermediate points
of action because the Qur’an cannot address them specifically
and maintain its multi-vocal (as opposed to univocal) nature.50
The Qur’an itself makes this distinction occasionally, explaining
that God could forgive small sins in light of greater good deeds
and emphasizing both action and intention as important aspects
of doing good, often repeating the phrase “None should be
charged with more than one can bear.” (2:233)51 Nonetheless,
the text generally separates the world into two camps: good or
evil, divine or profane, blessed or cursed, belief or unbelief. The
48
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opening of the second sura, “The Cow,” first makes this
distinction, defining the righteous as those:
Who believe in the unseen and are steadfast in
prayer; who give in alms from what We gave
them; who believe in what was revealed to you
and what was revealed before you, and have
absolute faith in the life to come.” (2:2-4)52
It is not the evildoers who are mentioned in contrast, but rather
the unbelievers, and they are charged with ignorance and
obtuseness as their most heinous sins:
It is the same whether or not you forewarn them;
they will not have faith. God has set a seal upon
their hearts and ears; their sight is dimmed and
grievous punishment awaits them. (2:5-7)53
Even when gradations of crime and equivalent gradations of
punishment exist, people are divided according to how “good” or
“evil” they appear to be based on their actions, and these
distinctions are murky when life situations differ, and particularly
when definitions of good and evil differ. Belief and unbelief, for
example, do have degrees. Even in describing the resentment of
non-Muslim monotheists (People of the Book), the Qur’an
reminds its readers that “God chooses whom he will for his
mercy.” (2:106)54 These monotheists are generally not included
in the term “believer,” but neither are they always cast among the
“unbelievers.” The Qur’an seems unclear on whether it is
unbelief or wrongdoing that distinguishes evil, or indeed what
the distinction is between them. Indeed these verses seem to
suggest that unbelief is the greatest form of wrongdoing,
although that connection is not established.
Thus, Islam
becomes a religion of compromised dualism, where good and
evil, belief and unbelief are set out in a straightforward manner,
but their specific nature and consequences remain unclear,
beyond the fact that, in general, the good and the believers are
rewarded, while the evil and the unbelievers are punished.
Thus, the issue of dualism in the Qur’an is at the very
heart of the problem of moral luck. Even though the text
52
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maintains its ambiguity, people fortunate enough to have earlier
or more significant exposure to the Qur’an are ultimately more
likely to lead righteous lives according to the broad standards
that the text sets. Cragg examines a commonly-held exegetical
view that non-believers simply cannot understand the text in the
same way as do believers, or at least those willing to believe, 55
which reminds us that the Qur’an is ultimately a call to faith, and
bolstering and inspiring this faith is its central concern. By
defining itself as a guide to virtue and implying that anything
outside of the text will not lead to virtue, the Qur’an presents its
adherents as better people in general. This idea becomes
problematic when we consider that exposure to the Qur’an is
certainly not equal throughout the world—Islam is not
predominant in most of the world, and scarcely has any presence
at all in some societies. No degree of clarity or proofs within the
text can completely account for inherent positive or negative
cultural biases—or ignorance—regarding the legitimacy of Islam
as a religion and the Qur’an as a religious text.
Exegesis is a useful tool to come to terms with these
issues that the Qur’an does not address directly, as Cragg notes.
But he also comments that exegesis can give us “a different justice
to the great original.”56 Ultimately, we must be wary of any
interpretation, however rational, that presents a position
different than the ideas conveyed in a plain-sense reading.
Many exegetes argue that God factors extenuating circumstances
into His judgment and knows what actions an individual would
take in any circumstance, and the Qur’an claims that all deeds,
good and bad, will weigh in favor of or against the individual.57
Baydawi uses this passage to argue for a scale of reward and
punishment,58 but that explanation does not solve all of the
problems associated with moral luck. The Qur’an mentions
several virtuous and prohibited actions specifically, from grave
sins like idolatry to minor ones such as the consumption of pork,
and associates them with rewards and punishments. These
prohibitions are not numerous, but some of them are culturally55
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specific. A person living in a society where adultery is a mortal sin
may be less inclined to commit such an act and thus fare better in
the afterlife than a person living in a society where it is merely
frowned upon.
Furthermore, the Qur’an frequently implies that belief is
a division between goodness and evil, even though it does not
make that position entirely clear. Belief in itself may denote
more than a belief in God, and Esposito singles out faith in the
ultimate judgment of God, acceptance of Muhammad as the seal
of prophecy, and thereby, faith that the Qur’an is unfailingly
accurate as central beliefs to the faith.59 The strict laws against
the vague concept of “idolatry” may cause a person in a
monotheistic society to be automatically rewarded for a natural
habit of belief while a person of equal faith in a polytheistic
culture may be punished for what he or she assumed was a
virtuous belief system. The text frequently uses phrases such as
“Those who believe in God and the Last Day, in the angels and
the Book and the prophets” (2:177)60 to denote the righteous,
which implies faith not only in a singular deity, but in the
apocalyptic tradition of mainstream monotheism.
The
injunctions to believe the words of Muhammad seem to imply
that faith in the legitimacy of the Qur’an itself is a precondition
of being a believer, which by extension implies that its specific
injunctions and commandments are necessary components of
belief as well. The specific virtuous actions mentioned in the text
generally relate to charity and goodwill in human relations, such
as “[giving] away [one’s] wealth to kinsfolk, to orphans, to the
destitute, to the traveler in need and to beggars, and for the
redemption of captives” (2:177) or to devotion to God
specifically, such as “attending to prayers.” (2:177)61 Although
the text does not specifically state that all unbelievers lack virtue
entirely, it speaks of evildoers and unbelievers in a similar
manner, and generally refers to their destiny as eternity in the
Fire, never directly acknowledging the possibility of an unbeliever
being accepted into Paradise.

59
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The Qur’an asserts: “None should be charged with more
than one can bear,” but it sets out absolute principles of faith and
action, condemning those who fail to meet certain standards to
death and destruction, in Hell if not in this life. This passage
assumes then that at least the obvious and fundamental
commandments set out by the Qur’an are within reach for all,
and it seems to ignore the cultural or personal barriers that may
prevent a person from reaching the realizations necessary to live
in accordance with the principles of Islam, which reinforces the
problematic of moral luck and raises questions about the
methods that God uses to judge people.
By setting only limited behavioral standards yet issuing
broad polemics against those who do not live according to the
way of God, the Qur’an creates some degree of confusion about
what makes a righteous person. This problem is difficult for any
religion to manage.
Some, like Sikhism, set only broad
requirements for righteous and evil conduct, and ultimately fail
to claim any real moral supremacy as a faith. Others, like
Judaism, attempt to legislate every possible aspect of behavior,
creating hundreds of thousands of rules that few are able to
follow precisely. The confusion in Islam is not necessarily a
problem for the religion—the Qur’an reminds its readers that
judgment belongs to God alone—but it does raise questions
about what sort of specific actions a person must take in order to
achieve righteousness in any given situation.
In his book The Islamic Ethics of Life, Jonathan Brockopp
attempts to find a Qur’anic view of modern issues concerning the
most basic religious principles about the right to live with regard
to abortion, war, and euthanasia. Examining both the Qur’an
and its rich exegetical tradition, Brockopp finds legitimate
interpretations that relate to his questions, but ultimately
comments that no single Islamic tradition can provide a definite
answer to these issues, even though the question deals with an
issue as large as the taking of a life.62 The imprecision of noncanonical tradition and the absolutist vagueness of the Qur’an
itself may leave even the most important issues open to fallible
human interpretation.

62
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One of the problems with setting any real absolute
standards for behavior is that people will inevitably attempt to
judge others based upon those standards, even though the text
states that “God chooses whom he will for his mercy” and as such
specifically forbids guessing the exact standards that God uses to
judge people. Yet by setting good and evil in such sharp contrast,
the Qur’an gives people rough guidelines with which to judge
human behavior, thus enabling society to condemn or reward
people inappropriately and undermining the text’s overall
message of submission to the will of God. This confusion of
morality affects even those who expressly follow the Qur’an, as it
seems to present two mutually exclusive methods of action,
forbidding judgment directly yet laying out incomplete standards
by which people are able to judge others, namely belief and
unbelief.
The hadiths complicate this dilemma, as they show acts
of human judgment, by the prophet Muhammad himself.
Muhammad makes several categories of actions, and lists specific
actions that fulfill certain virtues and those that must be attended
to or avoided in order to avoid sin.63 These ideas do not depart
from the strictures of the text, but as prophetic utterances it is
unclear whether or not they are divinely inspired, and thus
whether they can be viewed as true or even binding
interpretations. More problematic are those hadiths that speak
of conduct toward non-Muslims. Muhammad asks rhetorically,
“Do the Jews and Christians who read the Bible and Evangel act
on them?” chastising these groups. Yet he also advises, “When
the bier of anyone passeth by thee, whether Jew, Christian, or
Muslim, rise to thy feet.”64 The latter statement automatically
separates People of the Book for higher esteem in the eyes of
Muslims, while the former implies their general faults as a group.
These statements seem to give individual Muslims the authority to
distinguish between Muslims, People of the Book, and others,
although the invocation that God’s mercy is being unknowable is
made in reference to these divisions specifically. Zepp also notes
that the hadith tradition is not always historically reliable—
despite extensive scholarly research in the Medieval era in order
63
64
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to compile them accurately, so there is question over whether
observing the hadith tradition is following a prophet at all.65
Naturally, some human judgment of conduct is necessary in a
functioning society, but stories that tell of individual cases of
judgment, complimented by condemnations of certain groups
(Jews, Christians, and the unspecified “pagan” cultures) within
the text itself, seem to encourage humans to judge character
based on those standards which “God knows and you know not.”
(2:216)66
Admittedly, some philosophers—particularly those who
have taken a mystical approach to the Qur’an—have been able to
present a more satisfactory solution to the problem of moral luck
by abandoning the dualism that is implied in the text and
focusing instead on those passages which seem to bring the world
into greater unity.
These trends, such as Sufism, have
contributed a great deal to Islamic thought, but have never been
dominant philosophies in mainstream Muslim society. The one
exception to this rule, in my judgment, is some Shi’i
philosophers, although most members of that sect maintain a
relatively dualistic view of the world and have a strong attachment
to Qur’anic legalism. Sufism is at least the dominant mystical
tradition within Sunni Islam. But by stepping away from the
dualistic aspect of the Qur’an, mystic philosophers inevitably
interpret it in a relatively complicated manner, going beyond the
intuitive meanings of the text, and as Julian Baldick notes,
seeking to commune with God through experience rather than
revelation.67 Such interpretations undermine the emphasis on
the clarity of the Qur’an and the actions that it proscribes. When
the dualistic nature of the text is questioned, the commandments
of faith and unquestioning submission to God lose some
importance, so it is difficult for Islam to avoid the moral
problems brought on by dualism without altering the
fundamental nature of the religion.
Qur’anic law is relatively limited in scope, and given that
it applies to this life specifically, it is less dualistic, but its
regulations are still impacted by the problem of moral luck. Its
65
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implications stretch far beyond the text itself, with most of the
effects of luck felt in the human interactions of the world. The
Qur’an discusses inheritance laws excessively, stipulating various
family members who receive certain percentages of an estate. In
this sense, an individual’s place within his or her family grants
him or her greater or lesser reward according to divine law. The
different rights and duties of men and women in the Qur’an also
illustrate the aspect of luck in the rewards of this life. The fact
that “a male shall inherit twice as much as a female” (4:10)68
implies a moral distinction between the two genders, or at least
inequality in the eyes of God. These problems are not so
intractable given that this world is inherently imperfect, but
factors such as economic status within the world can determine
morality. A person with ample leisure time and resources is
better equipped to act and give charitably if they so choose,
enhancing their capacity to do deeds that may reflect well upon
them in the final judgment. A person born wealthy may have
intentions no better or worse than a person who cannot rise out
of poverty, but the wealthier individual is given the opportunity to
act, whereas the poor individual may never know how he or she
would have acted given equal opportunity.
The Qur’an also fails to address the issue of prerevelation morality. It talks of “apostles [of whom] we have
already told you” and “others of whom we have not yet spoken”
who are “apostles who “brought good news to mankind and
admonished them, so that they might have no plea against God
after their coming.” (4:164-5).69 According to the text, prophets
have existed in all societies and it mentions certain revelations
(the Tawrat or Torah, the Injil or Gospels, and the Zabur or
Psalms) specifically. The text also mentions that these scriptures
have been corrupted over time, yet notes that God has revealed
messages to all peoples.70 It is unclear whether early revelations
had a binding effect on the actions of people prior to the Qur’an
(especially if they were unknown prior to the revelation of the
Qur’an), but it presents a problem of justice either way. If early
revelations are indeed binding, then the Qur’an must account for
68
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its insistence that these books have been either lost or corrupted,
and so people have not been given full warning. If not, then
revelation seems to be a mixed blessing—an opportunity for
those who have access to the Qur’an and reason to believe it and
a more demanding standard of justice for those who do not. A.
Kevin Reinhart has analyzed various arguments concerning the
status of pre-revelation morality, and argues that such strictures
are often perceived as non-binding so that they do not
undermine the moral importance of the revelation of the Qur’an,
but that the actual legal position of the text is decidedly
unclear.71
Universality is crucial to the Qur’an’s claim of justice, yet
it addresses itself to Arab people specifically, calling itself “a Book
of revelations well expounded, an Arabic Qur’an for men of
knowledge.” (41:1)72 The text further claims the inimitability of
its language as one of the strongest proofs of its truth. This claim
may have been authoritative in the largely non-literary society of
Seventh Century Arabia, but it loses some legitimacy in the
modern world, where a reader may be able to find equals to its
eloquence and style. This claim is even less legitimate in nonArabic-speaking societies, who read the Qur’an in languages that
fail to capture the poetry and wordplay of the original text. Thus,
modern readers and non-Arabic-speaking readers are far more
likely to disregard the messages of the Qur’an simply because it
will not appear as convincing to them, and so they are
disadvantaged by the unfortunate luck of the language barrier
and their increased literacy.
The Qur’an succeeds in presenting a basic structure of
morality, centered upon faith and charity, but it ultimately lacks
the necessary specificity and clarity to form a clear picture of
righteous conduct to which modern readers can reasonably
aspire. More significantly, the dualism of action, belief, and
consequence that gives the text its force and certainty does not
seem compatible with the recognition that circumstance plays a
role in determining what is good action. The few absolute
standards that the Qur’an gives for judgment seem to favor some
individuals regardless of the choices that they make.
71
72
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